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The Honorable W. W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Walt:

Your letter of 7 August 1968, jointly to the Director of Central Intelligence and to the Secretary of Defense, initiated a study on intelligence contingency planning for Vietnam under the conditions of a bombing halt or a cease fire.

The study and resultant plans are forwarded herewith. They provide a list of intelligence requirements, designate targets, catalogue collection systems (both operational and R&D) which can be tasked and indicate responsible authorities. The study and Plan A (bombing halt) were approved by the USIB on 31 October 1968 and have since been informally coordinated with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and with the JCS. Plan B (Cease Fire) was approved by the USIB on 18 December 1968 and has been forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for comment or recommendations. This Plan has been inserted in the attached document, but since it has not yet been fully coordinated with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, it must be considered as tentative.

Plan A, as you will note, has actions specified which were required to take place before a bombing halt actually occurred. These were brought to the attention of the appropriate authorities within Defense in mid-October and action was taken prior to the announcement of the bombing halt.

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I have a continuing concern with regard to the maintenance of our intelligence capability in Vietnam after the cease fire and in the post hostilities period. This capability will be important not only to our position in Vietnam but also to the support of U. S. policy throughout the area. I believe that the additional attention which has been given to the overall intelligence problem in Vietnam as a result of this study and planning effort has resulted in an improved collection against critical targets since the bombing halt and that there will be beneficial results in the ensuing critical period, both from the intelligence collection standpoint and through enabling a better understanding of the continuing intelligence need.

/S/ Rufus Taylor

Rufus Taylor
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
Acting Director

Attachment: A/S

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